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This paper studies how different behavioural norms affect individual and social welfare 
in  a  population  with  heterogeneous  preferences.  I  assume  preferences  are  private 
information, and that interactions between individuals do not involve communication, 
nor bargaining. I first compare two stylized behavioural rules: one states “do to your 
neighbours what you would like them do to you”, also known as Jesus’ golden rule, 
while the other prescribes “don’t do to your neighbours what you would not like them 
do to you”, and is attributed to the Jewish rabbi Hillel (I century B.C.). I consider them 
as an idealization of an imperative and a more liberal approach to social norms. I find 
that aggregate welfare depends on the distribution of preferences in the society.  
A third, more realistic behavioural rule is then introduced, a retaliation strategy that 
prescribes “do to your neighbours what they have done to you”. I show that, if followed 
by everybody, this strategy leads to the selection of a single behaviour, which becomes 
established as a social norm. This behaviour leads in general to more inequality, with 
respect to the Jesus or Hillel rules. However, it is sufficient that a small group (about 
1%) of the population keeps on playing one of the two moral norms to recover the same 
social welfare that are obtained when everybody played that moral norm. 
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The Talmud tells that a gentile came to Hillel saying that he would convert to Judaism if Hillel could 
teach him the whole Torah in the time that he could stand on one foot. Hillel converted the gentile by 
telling him, “That which is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor. That is the whole Torah; the rest is 
commentary. Go and study it.” 
 
“And seeing the multitudes, Christ went up into a mountain. And when he was set, his disciples came 
unto him. And he opened his mouth, and taught them, saying – Do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you.” (Matthew 7:12) 
 
“And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, 




The  emergence  of  pro-social  behaviour  in  human  societies  has  been  the  matter  of 
thorough investigations. Two kinds of explanations have been advanced. One builds 
upon the hypothesis of rational behaviour of self-interested individuals, and stresses the 
importance  of  reciprocal  altruism  (Triver,  1971;  Axelrod  and  Hamilton,  1981): 
individuals cooperate in exchange of other people’s cooperation. The other stresses the 
importance  of  cultural (Cavalli-Sforza  et  al.,  1981;  Boyd  and  Richerson,  1985)  and 
genetic (Lumsden and Wilson, 1981; Simon, 1983; Wilson and Dugatkin, 1997; Sober 
and Wilson, 1998) evolution.   
 
In particular, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) review evidence that human behaviour is 
often  based  on  conditional  cooperation,  i.e.  cooperate  if  other  group  members 
cooperate, and defect if other group members defect. They stress the importance of 
mechanisms such as expectations, reputation and punishment in order to explain the 
emergence of reciprocal altruism. However, as Gintis (2000) argues, precisely when a 
group is threatened and is thus most in need of pro-social behaviour the probability of 
future interactions goes down, together with the incentives for reciprocal altruism.  
 
It is no surprise then that many studies have shown
1 that people are not only motivated 
by economic self-interest but also by norms of fairness and reciprocity, that in turn 
could be explained in terms of evolutionary selection, as sketched above. Religion is 
one of the mechanisms for strengthening these social norms. 
 
However, although in many cases it is straightforward to identify what is a pro-social 
behaviour, in general individual preferences are private information. Thus, if player A 
(the  active  player)  wants  to  act  in  an  altruistic  way  towards  player  B  (the  passive 
player), player A has to guess which action will please the most player B. This point has 
largely been neglected by the scientific literature, which assumes that the pro-social 
behaviour is always clearly identified. However, it is present in the religious literature, 
which generally makes the assumption that, not knowing what your neighbour likes, 
you should act as if your neighbour were not too different from yourself. This gave rise 
to a number of “golden rules”, of which two prototypes are the Christian and the Jewish 
golden rule quoted above. The rule stated by Jesus in his Mountain speech (hereafter, J-
                                                  
1 see the references in the review paper by Fehr and Fischbacher cited above.   4 
rule) prescribes to do what you think is good; the rule stated by Hillel (hereafter, H-rule) 
prescribes not to do what you think is bad. In the history of philosophy there are many 
antecedents  to  both  rules.  On  Jesus  side  we  have  the  Greek  philosophers  Sextus, 
Aristotle, Aristippus and Isocrates, while on Hillel side we have Pittacus, Thales and the 
Chinese philosopher Confucius.  
 
It is easy to find a flavour of socialism in the J-rule, while the H-rule looks definitely 
more  liberal. 
2  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  their  implications  for 
aggregate welfare in the simplest possible model. The model is described in section 2, 
while the results are derived in section 3. Then, it is then interesting to see what happens 
if some part of the population departs from the moral norm and plays a sort of tit-for-tat 
strategy (“what has been done unto you, do it to others”), which as we have seen is after 
all a very common behaviour.
 3 This extension is dealt with in section 4 and 5. Section 6 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The model 
The  model  is  the  same  as  in  the  companion  paper  Richiardi  (2005).  There  are  N 
individuals, who can be in 3 different states (call them Left, Center and Right), and  can 
play 3 actions (again Left, Center and Right). Interaction involves always one active and 
one passive player
4. Individuals have preferences over their states: they love one state, 
they are neutral with respect to another state and they hate the remaining state. When 
two  persons  meet,  the  active  player  sets  the  passive  player’s  state  according  to  his 
action, which in turn is determined by his moral norm.  
This  identifies  only  6  possible  combinations.  Denote  with  p1…p6  the  shares  of  the 
population characterized by each combination of preferences, as in table 1. That is, 
drawing randomly one individual, she will be of type i with probability pi.  
 
 
Type  Loved state  Hated state  Share 
1  Left  Center  p1 
2  Left  Right  p2 
3  Center  Left  p3 
4  Center  Right  p4 
5  Right  Left  p5 
6  Right   Center  p6 
 
Table 1: Distribution of preferences in the population 
 
                                                  
2  The  reader  should  not  consider  the  results  of  this  paper  as  a  judgement  over  different  religious 
prescriptions.  The  two  behavioral  rules  considered  are  named  after  Jesus  and  Hillel  for  ease  of 
identification, but many other references, aside all the philosophers cited above, could be found.  
3 This rule has also noble origins, reminding the “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” prescription of the Bible 
and an almost identical prescription to be found in the Hammurabi code (8
th century B.C.). However, as it 
will be clear later, the “tit-for-tat” rule used in the paper doesn’t allow to address the reaction specifically 
to the offender, thus the label BT, for “blind tit-for-tat”, that will be used. 
4 Agents can play both roles interchangeably.   5 
After each interaction, the passive player gets a payoff of +1 if she is in her loved state, 
a payoff of 0 if she is in her neutral state, and a payoff of –1 if she is in her hated state. 
The active player does not get any feedback
5.  
If the active player follows the J-rule, he always plays the action corresponding to his 
loved state. If he follows the H-rule he randomise between the actions corresponding to 
his loved and neutral state. An example will clarify. 
 
Suppose two individuals, A and B, meet. Player A is the active one. He hates Left and 
loves Right (he is thus neutral with respect to Center). Player B is the passive one. She 
loves Left and hates Right (she is neutral with respect to Center, like player A). Suppose 
A follows the J-rule. He will play Right, setting B’s state to Right. B will then have a 
payoff of –1. Suppose on the other hand that A follows the H-rule. He will randomise 
between Center and Right. The payoff for B could then be either 0 or –1. 
 
Note that there is no strategic interaction in the model: the passive player’s payoff 
depends on the active player’s choice, but the active player’s choice does not depend on 
the passive player in any way. This implies that game-theoretic solution concepts like 
Nash equilibrium become useless.  
 
Aggregate welfare is defined both in terms of the mean and the coefficient of variation 
of the payoffs (which denote respectively how rich and how unequal the society is). 
However, in order to avoid arbitrary choices I do not specify a particular functional 




It  is  straightforward  to  see  that  when  all  individuals  share  the  same  preferences 
(polarization)  the  J-rule  is  better.  In  the  other  extreme  case,  when  preferences  are 
equally distributed in the population (dispersion) and p1 = p2 =…= p6 = 
1/6, it is again 
straightforward to see that the two rules are equivalent, and lead to an average payoff  
p = 0. Should we infer that the J-rule always dominates the H-rule? 
 
3.1 Average payoffs 
 
Consider an active player of type 1 (he loves Left and hates Center), who meets in turn 
all other (passive) individuals, including himself. If he follows the J-rule, he will play 
Left, causing a payoff of +1 in (p1+p2)N individuals, and a payoff of –1 in (p3+p5)N 
individuals. Note that there are (p1+p2)N individuals like him in the population. 
Suppose  now  that  everybody  meets  everybody  else  both  as  active  and  as  passive 
player
7. The average payoff when everybody plays according to the J-rule is then 
 
) )( ( ) )( ( ) )( ( 6 5 4 2 6 5 6 4 3 1 4 3 5 3 2 1 2 1 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p J + + - - + + - + + - + + - - + + = p   (1) 
                                                  
5 We can suppose that he receives a positive payoff deriving from acting accordingly to his moral norm. 
6  In  Richiardi  (2005)  I  define  aggregate  welfare  only  in  terms  of  the  mean,  but  investigate  further 
extensions of the behavioural rules examined here. 
7 coupling individuals randomly and randomly choosing who is the active and who is the passive player 
only adds some noise to the results   6 
 












- - + +
+ - - + +







2 1 5 3 5 3
6 5 4 2 4 2
4 3 6 1 6 1
p p p p p p
p p p p p p
p p p p p p
H p   (2) 
 
To study the behaviour of pJ - pH I represent the distribution of preferences in the 
society as a single point in a three dimensional space
8, where the axes are labeled l, c 
and  r.  The  l  coordinate  is  found  by  counting  all  individuals  who  love  Left,  and 
subtracting all individuals who hate Left. The result is then normalized to the size of the 




l = p1 + p2 – p3 – p5 
c = p3 + p4 – p1 – p6 




and l + c + r = 0.  
Note that different distributions of preferences can lead to the same point in the sphere. 
For instance, the point in the origin is given not only by  6
1 ... 6 2 1 = = = = p p p , but by 
any combination of preferences such as  6 4 5 2 3 1 , , p p p p p p = = = .      
Note also that this mechanism is very close to defining a Borda count social welfare 
function. 
 
We can now define the polarization of the preferences in the society as the distance 
from the center of the sphere: 
 
2 2 2
6 2 1 ) , , , ( ) , , ( c r l p p p d c r l d + + = º K   (4) 
 
Note that  [ ] 2 , 0 Î d : all points thus lie inside a sphere around the origin. 
 
 
Figure 1 explores how the outcome varies as a function of the distance d. The whole 
range  [0,1]  is  sampled,  for  all  probabilities  p1  ..  p6
9.  When  0 > - H J p p   a  win  is 
assigned to the J-rule; when  0 < - H J p p  a win is assigned to the H-rule. For each 
bin
10, the frequency of wins with each rule is computed (Figure 1a). The average values 
of  J p and  H p  are shown in Figure 1b. 
                                                  
8 Florentin Paladi helped in defining this aggregation procedure 
9 The step considered for creating all combinations of probabilities is 0.025.  
10 The bin width used in the figure is 0.025   7 
Exactly in the center of the sphere the two rules lead to the same payoff, independently 
of the underlying distribution of preferences. Close to the center, each rule wins in 
about 50% of the cases. Then, as we move away from the center the J-rule improves its 
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(a)  (b) 
Figure 1: Frequency of negative and positive values of 
H J p p -  (a) and average values for pJ and pH (b). 
 
In  conclusion,  I  have  shown  that,  depending  on  the  underlying  distribution  of 
preferences,  both  rules  can  be  optimal.  However,  as  the  preferences  become  more 
polarized, the J-rule clearly takes the lead. 
 






H are defined for each discrete distribution D≡J,H with the 











D D i i D p p p s   (5) 
where     
 
4 3 2 1 , 1 p p p p J - - + = p  
6 5 2 1 , 2 p p p p J - - + = p  
4 3 2 1 , 3 p p p p J + + - - = p  
6 5 4 3 , 4 p p p p J - - + = p  
6 5 2 1 , 5 p p p p J + + - - = p  





2 / ) ( 6 5 3 1 , 1 p p p p H + - - = p  
2 / ) ( 5 4 3 2 , 2 p p p p H - + - = p  
2 / ) ( 6 5 3 1 , 3 p p p p H - + + - = p  
2 / ) ( 6 4 2 1 , 4 p p p p H - + + - = p  
2 / ) ( 5 4 3 2 , 5 p p p p H + - + - = p  
2 / ) ( 6 4 2 1 , 6 p p p p H + - - = p  
(5.2) 
   8 
Since variance is scale-sensitive however, it makes little sense to use it as a measure of 
dispersion when the mean values can significantly differ. I thus divide the standard 
deviation by the mean to obtain the coefficient of variation, which is scale-free. 
 
Figure  2a  shows  an  interesting  result:  although  in  general  different,  when  the  two 
coefficient of variations are conditioned on the distance d they give exactly the same 
value. On average however, when one rule is better in terms of higher expected payoffs 































(a) all sample 






























































(b) pJ > pH 
When the J-rule gives higher payoff, it also grants 
lower inequality 
(c) pJ < pH 
When the J-rule gives lower payoff, it also grants 
higher inequality 
 
Figure 2: Average value of the coefficient of  variations 
     9 
4. From moral to social norms 
 
Suppose now that all individuals act according to the following strategy: “if nobody 
acted to you, play according to the H-rule; otherwise do what your last opponent did to 
you”. This rule is reminiscent of the “tit-for-tat” strategy, with the only difference that 
the reciprocal behavior cannot be targeted to specific individuals. Thus, retaliation is 
directed towards society in general. For this reason it is labelled Blind tit-for-tat (BT).  
 
It is easy to see that this strategy always leads to the selection of a single action. Which 
action  will  actually  be  selected  depends  on  the  distribution  of  preferences  in  the 
population  and  on  the  (random)  order  of  interactions.  To  investigate  the  selection 
process, I draw randomly 4 out of 6 probabilities, say pa .. pd. We then set pe = 0 and the 
remaining probability  ) ( 1 e d c b a f p p p p p p + + + + - = . I consider, for computational 
reasons, a slightly modified version of the model, where each person interacts as active 
player with only one passive player, randomly chosen. I consider 600 individuals and 
simulate
11 all interactions for 1,000 periods – an amount of time generally sufficient – 
given the population size – for the selection process to take place. I perform 50 runs 
with the same parameters, and then consider the average of the frequencies of each 
action being played at t = 1,000. I then update the parameters by increasing pe of a 0.01 
step, and decreasing pf accordingly. I repeat the process until pf = 0. Figure 3 shows the 






i p p . As p5 – 
which corresponds to people loving Right and hating Left – increases, the probability 
that Left is selected decreases and the probability that Right is selected increases. No 
threshold  effects  are  present.  Such  smooth  transitions  are  observed  also  for  other 





Note that a 50% probability that one action is selected does not mean that half of the 
population plays that action, while the other half plays something else. It means that in 
50%  of  the  runs,  without  changing  the  parameters,  that  action  is  played  by  all 
individuals, while in the other 50% of the runs some other action is selected as the only 
action being played. 
 
                                                  
11  We  develop  an  agent-based  simulation  using  the  open-source  JAS  platform 
(http://jaslibrary.sourceforge.net), see Sonnessa (2004). 
12 In the companion paper (Richiardi, 2005) I show analytically that in the range (0,1) the fraction a of 

























Figure 3: Frequency of each action being played after 1,000 periods, BT-rule, four probabilities fixed, 
average of 50 runs for each set of the parameters. 
 
Note that this process of path dependency closely resembles the creation of a social 
norm, which prescribes to play one single action, irrespective of individual preferences. 
Should we have two distinct populations with the same distribution of preferences, it is 
very  likely  that  we  could  observe  the  selection  of  a  different  action  within  each 
population, as the social norm of that community. In fact, it is well known that the 
existence of social norms creates conformity within groups and heterogeneity across 
groups (Gintis, 2003). 
 
An interesting question is whether the selection of a single action leads to higher or 
lower average payoff, and to higher or lower variance. Figure 4 plots the evolution of the 
average payoff, from a situation where everyone plays according to the H-rule (up to t = 
100),  to  a  situation  where  everyone  plays  according  to  the  BT-rule  (from  t  =  100 
onward). After a period of oscillations the system eventually settles down and a single 
action is played by all individuals in the population. In the particular case depicted in 
Figure 4, the average payoff actually increases, in the stationary state (although during 
some parts of the transition process it is actually lower). The upper and lower bounds in 






96 . 1     bound upper    payoff   average
96 . 1     bound lower    payoff   average
+ =
- =
  (6) 
 
where mp  and sp are respectively the mean and the standard deviation of the average 
payoff under the moral norm regime, i.e. in the first 100 periods.
13 
                                                  
13 By the law of large numbers any statistics on the population, for a given distribution of preferences, is a 
Gaussian  random  variable.  Thus,  approximately  95%  of  the  observations  should  lie  in  the  interval 






















Figure 4: From moral to social norms. Up to t = 100 everybody plays according to the H-rule. From t = 
100  onward  everybody  plays  according  to  the  BT-rule.  After  a  period  of  oscillations,  one  action  is 
selected. Upper and lower bounds are computed using the average of the mean and the standard deviation 
of the payoffs during the H-rule regime. 
 
Table 2 reports the frequency when the mean and variance under the tit-for-tat strategy 
are  higher  (lower)  than  under  the  J-rule  and  H-rule,  respectively.  100  runs  are 
performed starting with the J-rule, and 100 runs are performed starting with the H-rule. 
Preferences are distributed randomly. During the first 100 periods of each run, every 
individual in the population follows the moral norm (either the J-rule or the H-rule). 
From t = 100 onward, everybody plays according to the BT-rule. The first 1,000 periods 
under the BT regime are discarded
14. Then, the average of the mean and variance of the 
payoffs  in  the  last  1,000  periods  are  compared  with  the  corresponding  significance 
interval computed when everybody played according to the moral norm. This interval is 




96 . 1     bound upper    variance







  (7) 
 
where  2 s m   and  2 s s are respectively the mean and the standard deviation of the payoff 
variance under the moral norm regime, i.e. in the first 100 periods. 
 
  Average payoff under BT-rule    Payoff variance under BT-rule 
                                                                                                                                            
changed the rules of behaviour, we can then conclude that we are sampling from a different distribution: 
the statistics (here, the average payoff or the variance) has significantly changed. 
14 This is generally sufficient for the selection of one single action, which is played by everyone in the 
population.   12 
  (social norm established*)    (social norm established*) 
  % higher than 
moral norm 
(+) 
% lower than 
moral norm 
(-) 
  % higher than 
moral norm 
(+) 
% lower than 
moral norm 
(-) 
pJ  .58  .42  s
2
J  .98  .02 
pH  .34  .39  s
2
H  .98  .00 
*   after convergence to a single action 
(+)  mean above the confidence interval for the moral norm 
(-)   mean below the confidence interval for the moral norm 
Table 2: Moral and social norms compared 
 
Table 2 shows that almost can happen with respect to the average payoff. The selection 
of a single strategy under the tit-for-tat regime leads to a significant increase in the 
average payoff in 58% of the runs, and to a significant decrease in 42% of the runs, 
when compared with the J-rule. When compared with the H-rule, it leads to a significant 
increase in the average payoff in 34% of the cases, to a significant decrease in 39% of 
the cases, and to results that are roughly similar in 27% of the cases. However, playing 
BT  leads  almost  always  to  an  increase  in  the  variance  of  the  payoffs,  hence  to  an 
increase in the degree of inequality in the population. This is rather intuitive: when only 
a  single  action  (the  social  norm)  is  played  in  a  population  with  heterogeneous 
preferences, someone will be very happy, while someone else very unhappy. 
 
5. From social norms to moral outcomes 
 
So  far,  I  have  compared  situations  where  everybody  played  according  to  the  same 
strategy, i.e. either following a moral norm (the J-rule or the H-rule) or following the tit-
for-tat rule. Now, it is interesting to see what happens when the “blind tit-for-tat” guys 
are  mixed  together  with  the  “moral”  individuals.  Are  we  going  to  observe  a 
proportionally “mixed” outcome? And if not, are a few BT reciprocators enough to 
disrupt the moral order, or, conversely, a few fellows of Jesus and Hillel are sufficient 
to “redeem” the entire population? The observation that reciprocity is indeed one of the 
pillars  of  human  societies  suggests  that  the  most  relevant  case  is  when  a  (possibly 
small) bunch of  “moral” individuals are introduced in a BT population.  
 
I look at the fraction of the entire population that has to play according to the moral 
norm  in  order  to  have  an  outcome  (in  terms  of  average  payoff  and  variance)  not 
significantly different to the one obtained when everybody plays according to the moral 
norm.  Table  3  reports, for  different  values  of  this  fraction,  the  frequency  when  the 
outcome for the statistics considered is within the significance interval, as defined above 
(mean + 1.96 std. dev., computed when everybody plays the moral norm). About 2,000 
simulation  runs  are  performed.  Preferences  are  randomly  distributed,  but  are  held 
constant while varying the fraction of the population that plays according to the moral 
norm.   13 
 
Fraction of the 
population playing 
the moral norm 
Runs  J-rule  H-rule 
    H0: p = pJ  H0: 
2 2
J s s =   H0: p = pH  H0: 
2 2
H s s =  
100.0%  560  97.7%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
5.0%  560  96.8%  99.8%  98.9%  99.6% 
1.0%  560  78.3%  83.2%  77.0%  84.1% 
0.5%  314  56.3%  65.9%  49.4%  63.1% 
Table 3: Non-refusal of the hypothesis that the mean and variance in the payoffs are equal to the case 
when everybody plays according to the moral norm (H0), different fractions of the population departing 
from the moral norm considered. 
 
When only 5% of the population plays according to the moral norm, the outcome is not 
significantly different from that occurred when everybody shared the moral norm in 
96.8% of the cases for the J-rule, and in 98.9% of the cases for the H-rule. A small 
fraction  of  1%  of  “moral”  guys  is  sufficient  to  guarantee  the  same  result  as  in the 
“moral” society three quarters of the times! 
 
6. Conclusions 
Preferences lie at the foundations of economics. The literature on reciprocity and the 
emergence of social norms generally makes the assumptions that preferences, or at least 
some proxy, are observable. Individuals can thus decide whether to be keen toward their 
neighbours  or  not.  Conversely,  the  case  when  preferences  are  not  observable  has 
received  little  or  no  attention  at  all  in  the  scientific  literature.  This  is  surprising, 
especially because the theme is at the hearth of the western religious literature. This 
paper  provides  a  very  simple  model  of  individual  interaction,  in  order  to  test  the 
implications in terms of aggregate welfare of two well-known moral norms: the so-
called golden rules of Jesus (“do to your neighbours what you would like them do to 
you”) and the prescription by Hillel (“don’t do to your neighbours what you would not 
like them do to you”). I consider them as an idealization of an imperative and a more 
liberal  approach  to  social  norms.  I  find  that  the  aggregate  welfare  depends  on  the 
distribution of preferences in the society. When the preferences are highly fragmented, 
the  two  rules  give  roughly  the  same  expected  payoff;  However,  as  the  preferences 
become more polarized, the fraction of combinations favourable to the J-rule increase, 
and reaches 100% when the preferences are totally polarized. So, the J-rule turns out to 
stochastically dominate the H-rule, for an unknown distribution of preferences. 
15 
 
A third, more realistic behavioural rule is then introduced, a “blind tit-for-tat” strategy 
that prescribes “do to your neighbours what they have done to you”. I show that if this 
strategy is followed by everybody it leads to the selection of a single behaviour, which 
becomes  established  as  a  social  norm.  This  behaviour  leads  in  general  to  more 
inequality, with respect to the Jesus or Hillel rules. However, it is sufficient that a small 
                                                  
15 In Richiardi (2005) I suggest another opearationalization of the H-rule, which turns out to be always 
better than the J-rule proposed here.   14 
group (about 1%) of the population keeps on playing one of the two moral norms to 
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